tials of this class-warfare which
was being fought ... It is beyond question that, had we been able to tear
the Polish Army from the hands of the Polish bourgeoisie, the revolution
of the worker-class in that country would have been an accomplished fact.
The subsequent conflagration would not have been limited to the walls of
Poland, but as an untamed torrent it would have swept through western
Europe . . . The Red Army will not forget this experience. And if and
when the European bourgeoisie will challenge us to fight, the Red Army
will be able to defeat it, and to support and spread the revolution throughout
Europe."
Although Lenin was of a different opinion and had rightly assessed the
idea of class-warfare in connection with Poland to be valueless, neverthe-
less this idea of' war in the rear of the enemy ' was to become one of the
essential features of the Soviet war doctrine. At first all hopes were
exclusively directed towards the effect of this action on the morale of the
enemy, but as time went on and the prospects of revolution in Europe
faded, the main Russian effort in the preparation for this warfare was
shifted from the moral to the material factors. The subsequent result
was the tremendous development of the paratroops in Russia. Airborne
regiments, trained in the Red Army camps, seemed a safer instrument for
effective use than the most efficient Cominimist Party organised in the
enemy's hinterland.
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